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 Abstract 
 
 Non-uniform pricing equilibria are shown to dominate uniform pricing equilibria in free 
entry, monopolistically competitive markets with identical consumers.  The non-uniform pricing 
equilibrium is welfare optimal.  Comparisons of Cournot and non-uniform pricing equilibria in terms 
of the equilibrium number of firms and sales per firm show that the positioning of Cournot equilibria 
relative to the welfare optimal configuration of firms and outputs depends on the relative curvatures 
of inverse demand and average cost functions, entry-induced rotation of inverse demand functions, 
and the relative price effects of changes in own and other firms outputs.  The choice between the 
non-uniform and uniform pricing interpretations of equilibria in differentiated product markets may 
have important implications for policy analysis.  
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 Monopolistic Competition with Two-Part Tariffs 
 
I. Introduction 
 While non uniform prices (NUPs) would seem to be an obvious response to the triangle of 
deadweight loss associated with uniform prices (UP) and downward-sloping demand functions, 
models of competition in differentiated product industries have, for the most part, assumed uniform 
prices.  Thus, unexploited gains from trade is an implicit assumption of these models.  The reliance 
on the UP assumption may have been dictated more by the presumed intractibility of NUP models 
than by a belief that UP models better describe real-world markets. 
 In this paper we show that, for the commonly employed assumption of identical consumers 
(or, equivalently, a single consumer), it is possible to model NUP competition among sellers of 
differentiated products in a way that is a straightforward and intuitive analogue of UP models.  
When firms can use NUPs to extract all of the surplus under their demand functions, a monopolistic 
competition equilibrium in NUPs can be described by substituting average surplus functions1 for 
inverse demand functions and substituting inverse demand functions for marginal revenue functions 
in the usual UP model of monopolistic competition.  With this approach, it is easy to show that the 
NUPs dominate UPs in a free entry equilibrium in differentiated product industries because access to 
the triangle of deadweight loss associated with UPs enables sellers to offer better deals to buyers. 
 This conclusion is opposite to the findings of recent work on multifirm, competitive 
equilibria in markets for homogeneous goods.2  Mandy (1992) demonstrates that the uniform pricing 
assumption is theoretically sound for multi-firm, competitive markets for homogenous goods as long 
as free entry drives profits to zero.3  While earlier work by Mandy (1991) and models by Hayes 
                                                 
    1  For a firm selling output x, the average surplus associated with x is the area under its inverse 
demand function up to x divided by x. 
    2  However, Panzar and Postlewaite (1984) and Shaffer (1987) have shown that NUPs dominate 
UPs in contestable natural monopolies. 
    3  Mandy also shows that if entry barriers limit the number of firms in a market to less than the fee 
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(1987) and Locay and Rodriguez (1992) showed that there are circumstances in which two-part 
tariffs (TPTs) dominate uniform prices in competitive, homogeneous good markets, each of these 
studies dealt with special cases in which TPTs facilitate transfers among individuals (or among 
potential states of the world for a given individual) that are not possible with uniform prices.  In the 
absence of a demand for such transfers, Mandy (1992) shows that non-uniform prices can always be 
undercut by a uniform price set equal to minimum average cost. 
 Casual empiricism suggests that product differentiation is common and probably 
predominates in consumer good industries.  Our analysis suggests that absent transactional barriers 
to its implementation, non-uniform pricing should be just as common.  While the prevalence of non-
uniform prices can only be determined empirically, we would suggest that they are probably more 
common than has heretofore been recognized.  We show below that NUPs may superficially appear 
very much like UPs.  Therefore, it is likely that NUPs are frequently not recognized for what they 
are because economists have been conditioned to think in terms of uniform-pricing models.  This has 
probably resulted in mistaken analyses of the nature of competition and inappropriate policy 
prescriptions for a number of industries. 
 This paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we show that non-uniform prices 
dominate uniform prices in monopolistically competitive markets with identical consumers and 
describe the NUP pricing as a non-cooperative equilibrium.4  We show that NUP equilibria are 
characterized by an average surplus curve-average cost curve tangency that is similar in appearance 
to the demand curve-average cost curve tangency of a Chamberlinian equilibrium.  The NUP 
equilibrium is also welfare-optimal.  UP and NUP equilibria are compared in Section III in terms of 
numbers of firms and output per firm.  The shapes of the cost functions, as well as the shapes of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
entry number, two-part tariffs dominate if competition is Bertrand. 
    4  In the NUP equilibrium, firms employ TPTs or other pricing schemes that are equivalent to 
TPTs from a representative consumer's perspective 
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demand functions and the manner in which they shift in response to the entry or increased outputs of 
competitors, are critical to determining the relative outputs and numbers of firms for the two 
equilibria.  The analysis is illustrated in Section IV through an example that uses a specific class of 
utility functions.  Section V discusses non-Cournot competitive responses.  Section VI presents our 
concluding remarks. 
 
II. Non-Uniform Price Dominance and Competitive Equilibrium 
 Consider a market for differentiated products where firms compete in quantities under the 
assumption that competitors outputs remain constant.  Figure 1 depicts a representative firm in a 
zero-profit Chamberlinian equilibrium with its demand curve tangent to its average cost curve.  The 
price  p1  and quantity  x1  corresponding to the tangency also maximize profits because the tangency 
implies marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.  Product differentiation is implicit in the downward 
sloping demand curve. 
 As a simplifying assumption, let  D  represent the demand of a single individual who 
accounts for all of the sales of all products in the market.  That is, the demand curves for all other 
products in this market represent the demands of this same individual.5  The analysis would be the 
same if  D  and the demands for all other products were the aggregated demands for a large number 
of identical consumers, each of whom prefers some diversity in his or her consumption of this class 
of products.6 
                                                 
    5  The representative consumer assumption is common in modelling exercises reported in the 
industrial organization literature.  See Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Chamberlin 
(1962) for applications to monopolistic competition. 
    6  The assumption that the single consumer is representative of many homogeneous consumers 
means that issues relating to monopsony can be ignored. 
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 Both sellers and consumers (the 
consumer) might expect to do better than at 
the tangency in Figure 1 if they could 
negotiate a more complex contract.  For 
example, assuming the quantity produced 
by other firms is held constant, consumer 
surplus and seller profits could both be 
increased by a two-part tariff with a per unit 
price of  p2  and a fixed tariff  E  equal to  
(p1 - p2)x1.  Consumer surplus would increase by the area of triangle A, and the seller's profits would 
increase by the area of B.  Of course, if consumers were price takers, the firm would set  E  equal to 
the area under the demand curve above  p2.  Therefore a uniform price would never be employed 
when the seller could employ a two-part tariff (TPT) instead.7 
 In the presence of TPTs, Chamberlinian demand-average cost curve tangencies cannot be a 
feature of a free entry equilibrium.  Positive profits would attract entry, which would shift demand 
curves inward.  Even without entry, demand curves would shift inward as all firms tried to increase 
output to the point of the demand curve-marginal cost intersection.  Therefore, demand curves must 
lie inside of average cost curves in an equilibrium with two-part tariffs. 
 It is straightforward to show that the zero-profit equilibrium with two-part tariffs is 
characterized by the tangency of an average surplus curve with the average cost curve that looks 
very much like the Chamberlinian average revenue-average cost tangency, where average surplus 
for quantity x, AS(x), is defined to be the area under the inverse demand curve up to  x  divided by x, 
i.e., AS(x) = [I
0
x p(y)dy]/x.  The two-part tariff equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.  The average 
                                                 
    7  In the discussion that follows, we use TPTs as representative of full surplus extracting NUPs 
generally. 
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surplus curve lies above the demand curve since it averages the higher willingness to pay of earlier 
units.8  Note that the inverse demand function bears the same relationship to  AS  as marginal 
revenue does to the inverse demand function and lies completely inside of the average cost curve.9  
The TPT can be thought as consisting of a marginal fee  p(x*)  equal to  MC(x*), and a fixed fee 
equal to the shaded area T = [pas - p(x*)]x*.  Since  pas = AS(x*), it is easy to show that T is also equal 
to the area under the demand and above  p(x*)  from quantity zero up to  x*. 
 To see that this is an 
equilibrium, let total cost for 
output  x, TC(x), be 
composed of a fixed cost, F, 
and variable cost  V(x), with 
marginal cost  MC(x) = 
MV(x)/Mx.  Let  i = 1, ...,  n  
firms offer two-part tariff 
contracts.  We will establish 
the AS-AC tangency 
configuration as a non-
cooperative equilibrium of this game.  Let the ith firm offer  Ti  as the fixed fee, and  pi  as the 
marginal fee.  This implies a revenue for firm  i  of  Ri(x) = Ti  + xpi, and an average revenue 
function  ARi(x) = pi + Ti/x.  If, for any  x, ARi(x) > AC(x), another firm  j, selling the same variant 
of the product as  i, can undercut firm  i  by offering a contract with  ARj(x)  below  ARi(x)  but 
                                                 
    8  AS(x) > p(x)  ]  S(x) = I
0
x p(y)dy > xp(x), which is true for any downward-slopping demand 
curve since  p(y) > p(x)  for all  y < x. 
    9  Marginal revenue is the partial derivative of total revenue, and price is the partial derivative of 
total surplus with respect to  x. 
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above or at average cost,  ARi(x) > ARj(x) $ AC(x).  Therefore, competition between firms will 
force each firm to offer an average revenue function below  AC  or at most at  AC; i.e., ARi(x) # 
AC(x)  for all  x.  Further, at the operating output  x*, a firm must cover costs to stay in business, i.e., 
ARi(x*) = AC(x*).  Clearly, two firms offering the same variety cannot coexist. 
 The consumer who buys quantity  x  is willing to pay up to the total surplus of  x.  Therefore 
the consumer is willing to pay an average price of  AS(x).  Consumers buy  x  if  AS(x) $ ARi(x).  
Combining this with earlier results, we have  AS(x*) $ ARi(x*) = AC(x*). 
If  AS(x*) > ARi(x*) = AC(x*), and firm i is the only one providing this brand, it has an incentive to 
offer a higher average revenue function.  Such an action cannot be part of an equilibrium as 
explained above (because firm i can then be undercut by firm j).  Therefore at equilibrium we must 
have  AS(x*) = ARi(x*) = AC(x*)  for produced quantity  x*.  For all other levels of production the 
average revenue schedule of firm i lies below average cost.  Therefore it is tangent to average cost at 
x*.  Equality of average surplus to average cost, together with tangency of  AS  and  AC, implies 
equality of unit price to marginal cost.  To see this, note that  dAC/dx / ACN = (MC - AC)/x  and  
dAS/dx / ASN = (p - AS)/x, so that  ACN = ASN  and  AC = AS  implies  p = MC(x*).10 
 An arbitrary number of firms, with each firm producing one variety, will result in an  AS(x)  
function that may lie above or below  AC(x).  Further, as the number of substitutes increases, the 
demand and average surplus function of each variety shifts inwards.  Therefore, there exists a 
number of varieties that makes  AS(x)  and  AC(x)  just touch at  x*.  Since every product that 
generates consumer benefits as great as its costs is produced at the optimal level of production, the 
TPT (NUP) equilibrium is also welfare-optimal (Spence 1976). 
 How important is the equilibrium depicted in Figure 2 as a description of empirical reality? It 
is not hard to identify "competitive" markets with two-tariffs:  for example, taxi meters start with a 
                                                 
    10  For constant marginal cost, the fixed fee is exactly equal to the lump-sum part of the two-part 
tariff. 
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fixed fee to which is added a constant per mile charge, bars and movies theaters change fixed 
admission fees and sell food and beverages on a per unit basis, and mortgages agreements usually 
involve an up front payment of points in addition to the monthly interest charge; but most goods and 
services clearly are not priced in this manner, perhaps because it is too expensive to enforce 
prohibitions on resale.  The administrative costs of collecting both parts of the tariff may be another 
transactional barrier to employing two-part tariffs. 
 Other pricing schemes for which resale is not a problem can be employed to accomplish 
exactly the same end, however.  For example, the good in Figure 2 might be sold at a per unit price 
of  pas + v  with the understanding that consumers purchasing  x*  receive a rebate of  vx*.  As long as 
 pas + v  was greater than the price intercept of the demand curve, the outcome would be the same as 
for the two-part tariff illustrated in Figure 2.  This might account for ostensible promotional practices 
such as two-for-the-price-of-one sales and the quantity-based ties to other products, such as the 
glassware that gas stations formerly gave to customers who filled their tanks during price wars and 
the frequent practice of mail order book services of allowing customers to select an additional title 
free when their orders exceed a certain dollar threshold.  Quantity discounts, normally considered to 
be second degree price discrimination, could serve the same purpose.  Full surplus would be 
extracted by setting price above the price intercept for purchases of less than  x*  and charging  pas  
for purchases of  x*  or greater. 
 The simplest alternative to two-part pricing that is equivalent in surplus extracted, and one 
that is no more difficult to administer than uniform pricing, may be for firms to package their 
products in fixed-quantity sales units of  x*  sold at a per sales unit "price" of  pasx*.  Many, if not 
most, products are sold in this manner.  A 20 oz. box certainly is no more a natural unit for 
measuring Cheereos than a Ford Taurus is a natural unit for measuring transportation services.  
Economies of scale in packaging undoubtedly dictate that most products be offered in a limited 
number of different-sized packages; but absent transaction cost barriers, profit maximization 
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requires that package size be determined by the logic of the non-uniform pricing model developed 
here when products are differentiated.  This theoretical necessity, combined with its consistency with 
a broader range of price and packaging strategies, and a common tendency to interpret sales of fixed-
quantity packages at a single per package price as uniform pricing, are the basis of our claim in the 
introductory section that we probably encounter non-uniform pricing in a wide variety of markets of 
common goods and services, but fail to recognize it for what it is due to a training-induced bias 
toward the uniform price interpretation. 
 
III. Comparing UP and NUP equilibria 
 Perhaps the most frequently recurring question in the literature on monopolistic competition, 
at least since the "excess capacity controversy,"11 is whether competitive markets provide the 
welfare optimal number of differentiated products.12  A closely related but less intensively 
investigated question is how closely output per product (or per firm) approaches optimal levels. 
                                                 
    11  See articles by Barzel (1970), Demsetz (1959, 1964, 1968), and Schmalensee (1972). 
    12  Work with various models of consumer demand has shown that product diversity at a 
competitive equilibrium may exceed or fall short of the optimum.  In their survey of the work on the 
diversity question, Besanko, Perry and Spady (1990) observe that, while there are exceptions, 
findings of too little variety are generally associated with representative consumer models, such as 
that presented in the previous section, while findings of too much variety are generally produced 
with spatial and characteristics models.  They hypothesize that the strong association of too little 
diversity with representative consumer models and too much diversity with spatial and 
characteristics models is a reflection of the generalized nature of competition in the former and the 
localized nature of competition in the latter.  All products are equally good substitutes for each other 
in representative consumer models, so competition is generalized across firms; but a product 
competes directly only with near neighbors in spatial and characteristics models.  Thus, new brands 
"crowd" the characteristics space in the characteristics models, whereas, they create a new 
dimension to the preference space in the representative consumer models.  This suggests that the 
social value of an additional firm will be lower in characteristics models than in representative 
consumer models.  The logit model of competition with an extreme value representation of 
consumer demand described in Besanko et al., which does not fit either the representative consumer 
demand or the spatial/characteristics interpretation of consumer demand, generates too little 
diversity.  Each firm is in direct competition with all other firms in this model, however. 
 
 
 9
 In this section we show that comparisons of UP equilibria with the optimum can be 
described in terms of three basic relationships:  (1) The shape of the inverse demand function facing 
the individual firm; (2) The degree of substitutability between different firms' outputs; and (3) The 
shape and location of the average cost curve.  Knowledge of the first relationship is sufficient to 
determine whether output per firm at a UP equilibrium exceeds of falls short of its value at the 
optimum.  Consideration of the other two relationships is necessary to answer the diversity 
question.13 
 
III.A Comparison of UP and NUP Equilibrium Outputs 
 The importance of the shape of the inverse demand function and entry- or output- induced 
changes in slopes in answering the relative output question is evident in Figure 3, where  xc  is 
equilibrium sales per firm in the standard Cournot equilibrium with uniform prices,  xt  is 
equilibrium per firm output for Cournot competitors with two-part tariff equivalent non-uniform  
prices, and  Dc, Dt  and  ASt  are the associated inverse demand and average surplus functions when 
prices are uniform and non-uniform respectively.  Whether  xc  is greater than or less than xt  (the 
value of  x  at the global optimum) depends on whether the  Dc-AC tangency lies to the right or to 
the left of the  ASt-AC tangency.14  With declining average cost, this is determined entirely by the 
relative slopes of the inverse demand and average surplus functions at the two equilibria.  If  Dc  is 
steeper than  ASt, xc  is greater than  xt  and vice versa.  The case illustrated in Figure 3 is that of 
linear inverse demand functions derived from a quadratic utility function, which is a special case of 
the example of Section IV. 
                                                 
    13  Whether consumers are representative or competition is local plays no necessary role in this 
analysis. 
    14  The absolute difference between  xc  and  xt  also depends in part on the slope of the average 
cost function.  It is curious that while economists have worked with different demand 
representations, they haven't investigated the impact of variation in cost functions. 
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 To move from the  Dc-AC  tangency to the  ASt-AC  tangency, the inverse demand function 
must shift inward.  In the process, the slopes of  D  and  AS  may change, which will affect the 
relative values of  xt  and  xC.  To isolate the effect of the difference in the relative values of the two 
slopes from the effects of shifts in these values, we assume in this subsection that  D  and  AS  shift 
parallel to themselves in response to entry or increases in the outputs of other firms, before 
considering the effects of changes in slope.  Inverse demand functions that are separable in own 
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output and the outputs of other firms have this property.  Inverse demand functions that are linear in 
own and other firms' outputs are a common example. 
 Intuition suggests that, in general, the average surplus function (AS) is flatter than the 
underlying inverse demand function, but that is not always the case.  In fact we can show that linear 
or concave inverse demand functions imply an average surplus function that is flatter than the 
inverse demand function, and exceptions occur only for very convex inverse demand functions.  
This is stated in the following Lemma.  Its proof is in the appendix. 
 
 Lemma 1:  (a)  For a weakly concave demand curve, the average surplus curve is 
flatter than the demand curve, *ASN(x)* < *pN(x)*. 
 (b)  The average surplus function is concave (convex, linear) if and only if the demand 
function is concave (convex, linear). 
 
 If the average surplus function is flatter than the underlying demand, and the demand curve 
for variety i shifts parallel to itself when a larger amount of other varieties is produced, we can 
clearly see that  A  lies to the right of  B  on the  AC  curve in Figure 3.  We prove this in the 
following theorem. 
 
 Theorem 1:  For weakly concave demand curves, if the demand curve for variety i 
shifts parallel to itself when the outputs of other varieties increase, then a larger amount of 
each variety is produced at the NUP equilibrium than at the UP equilibrium. 
 
 Proof:  Suppose otherwise, i.e., that  xc > xt.  By the tangency at the monopolistic competition 
equilibrium we have 
 
 *ACN(xc)* = *pcN(xc)*. 
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By the weak concavity of demand curve, we have 
 
 *pcN(xc)* $ *pcN(xt)*. 
 
By the parallel shift property, 
 
 *pcN(xt)* = *ptN(xt)*. 
 
Using Lemma 1(a) at point  xt  we have 
 
 *ptN(xt)* > *AStN(xt)*. 
 
Finally, by tangency at the TPT equilibrium we have 
 
 *AStN(xt)* = *ACN(xt)*. 
 
Combining these inequalities we get 
 
 *ACN(xc)* > *ACN(xt)*. 
 
But given the assumption in the beginning of the proof that  xc > xt, and the convexity of  AC we 
have  
 
 *ACN(xt)* > *ACN(xc)*, 
 
which contradicts the last inequality.  Therefore we must have  xc # xt.   
 Equal production at the two equilibria, xc = xt, is immediately ruled out since if it were true 
we would have 
 
 *ACN(xc)* = *pcN(xc)* > *AScN(xc)* = *AStN(xc)* = 
 
 = *AStN(xt)* = *ACN(xt)* = *ACN(xc)*, 
 
 
a contradiction.  Therefore  xc < xt.  QED. 
 If we relax the parallel shift assumption, then the slopes of  D  and  AS  may change as other 
firms enter or change their outputs.  If the slope of AS increases (in absolute value) as it shifts in, this 
increases the likelihood that  xc > xt  and vice versa if the slope of  AS  decreases.  This should be 
apparent from inspection of Figure 3. 
 
 
 13
 
 
III.B Comparing UP and NUP Equilibrium Numbers of Varieties 
 To examine factors influencing the relative numbers of UP and NUP equilibrium product 
varieties, it is necessary to take explicit account of the behaviors of other firms.  Therefore, let  pi = 
pi(xi, x, n)  be the inverse demand function for firm  i  in a market with  n  firms, where  x  is the 
common value of output for all firms except firm  i.  Let  ASi(xi, x, n) =  
[I
0
xi pi(y, x, n)dy)]/xi  be the associated average surplus function.  With imperfect substitutes, pi  and  
ASi  are declining in all three arguments. 
 Let  n  be the equilibrium number of firms in a symmetric equilibrium and set  xi = x = s, a 
common level of output for all firms in the market.  Let  P(s, n) / pi(s, s, n)  be the industry inverse 
demand function scaled to the size of a representative firm for an n-firm equilibrium.  Clearly, 
dP(s)/ds < Mpi/Mxi.  That is, the industry inverse demand function is steeper than the individual firm's 
inverse demand function due to substitutability among products. 
 Given  F  and  k, the fixed and marginal costs common to all firms, the industry inverse 
demand function for the UP equilibrium number of firms passes through point B in Figure 3, where  
P(xc, nc) = AC(xc) = k + F/xc.  The industry inverse demand function for the NUP equilibrium 
number of firms also passes through the point  (xt, k), since at the non-uniform pricing equilibrium, 
the marginal consumer is willing to pay marginal cost, i.e., P(xt, nt) = k.  Therefore the difference in 
prices (the markup at  B) is equal to the average fixed cost at B: 
 
 
 P(xc, nc) - P(xt, nt) = F/xc. 
 
 
Using a linear approximation on the LHS we have 
 
 
(dP/ds)(xt - xc) + (dP/dn)(nt - nc) = - F/xc  ]  nt - nc = - [F/xc + (dP/dx)(xt - xc)]/(dP/dn). 
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Since  dP/ds < 0, dP/dn < 0, nt > nc  ]  F/xc > (xt - xc)*dP/ds*.  In the "standard" case of Lemma 1 
and Theorem 1, xt > xc, and the inequality is equivalent to the line  P(s, nc)  passing through  B  in 
Figure 3, which is the industry inverse demand function for  nc  firms, intersecting  MC  to the right 
of  xt. 
 Thus, while  xt >< xc  is determined by the relative slopes of the firm's inverse demand and 
average surplus functions, the slope of the industry inverse demand function must also be considered 
to determine whether  nt >< nc, that is, whether the UP equilibrium has more or less than the optimum 
variety.  The flatter is the industry inverse demand function, the more likely is  nt > nc.  Further, the 
industry inverse demand function is steeper than the representative firm's inverse demand function, 
dP/ds < Mpi/Mx1, because increases in competitors' outputs also suppress its price.  The price-
suppressing effects of competitors' products are greater the more substitutable they are for the firm's 
own product.  Therefore, nt < nc  is more likely the greater the degree of substitutability between the 
products of competing sellers.  The intuition for this result is straight forward.  The higher the degree 
of substitutability among products, the more will the individual firm's inverse demand function shift 
inward as firms expand their outputs with a shift from UP to NUP pricing.  For a sufficiently high 
degree of substitutability, the inward shift of firm inverse demand functions will be so large that 
average surplus functions will end up interior to the average cost function and some firms will have 
to leave the market if the break-even conditions is to be satisfied. 
 Clearly, cost plays a role in determining the relative values of  nt  and  nc.  Consider, for 
example, a unidimensional spatial market with products evenly distributed throughout the product 
space in equilibrium.15  For any seller, the degree of substitutability between its product and the 
products of it closest competitors is greater the more tightly sellers are packed in the product space.  
Increasing fixed costs would reduce the number of firms in a UP equilibrium and increase the 
                                                 
    15  See, for example, Salop (1979) and Economides (1989). 
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average distance between those who remain.  This would reduce the substitutability between 
competitors' products, which would increase the likelihood that  nt > nc. 
 
IV. An Example 
 We illustrate this analysis by examining symmetric UP and NUP equilibria for inverse 
demand functions of the form  
 
 
 pi = a - bxi" - (n - 1)xc(, (2) 
 
 
where   ", (, a, b, c > 0, xi  is the representative firm's output, n  is the number  of firms in the 
market, and  x  is the level of output of any firm other than i.  This functional form gives us 
considerable flexibility in examining the independent effects of the curvature of the own and firm-
proportionate industry inverse demand functions.  When  " = ( = 1, both the firm and industry 
demands are linear; in that case the demand can be generated by a representative consumer with 
quadratic utility function 
 
 
 U = v + Ei axi - (Ei bxi2 + 2Ei Ej…i cxixj)/2, 
 
 
with  i, j = 1, ..., n, and  v > 0.16 
 The cost function  C(x) = F + kx  is also common to all firms.  At the NUP equilibrium, price 
is equal to marginal cost, p = k  and, since entry drives profits to zero, F equals the area above  k 
under the representative firm's inverse demand function up to quantity xt.  Solving for  xt  gives 
 
 
                                                 
    16  Firm inverse demand functions are concave iff  " > 1.  When  " = 1, the industry inverse 
demand function is concave if  ( > 1. 
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 xt = [(" + 1)F/("b)]1/("+1). (3) 
 
 
The number of varieties is 
 
 
 nt  = {(a - k)[(" + 1)F/("b)]-(/("+1) - b[(" + 1)F/("b)](" - ()/("+1)}/c + 1. (4) 
 
 
 In contrast, the free-entry UP Cournot equilibrium is characterized by two conditions: 
 
 
 MAi/Mxi = 0  ]  pi - k = "bxi", 
 
and 
 Ai = 0  ]  (pi - k)xi = F. 
 
 
Solving for the Cournot UP equilibrium values of  xi  and n, we have, 
 
 
 xc = (F/"b)1/("+1), (5) 
and 
 
 nc = {(a - k)[F/("b)]-(/("+1) - b(" + 1)[F/("b)](" - ()/("+1)}/c + 1. (6) 
 
 
 It is immediate by inspection that  xt > xc, as long as  " > 0.  Note that this result holds for 
both concave and convex demand functions, whereas Theorem 1 guaranteed the result only for 
concave functions. 
 Comparing the equilibrium numbers of products in UP and NUP competition, we have 
 
 
nt - nc = (F/ab)-(/("+1){b(F/ab)"/("+1)["+1 - ("+1)("-()/("+1)] - (a - k)[1 - ("+1)-(/("+1)]}/c. (7) 
 
 
This comparison makes clear the importance of fixed costs in determining whether product diversity 
at the UP equilibrium exceeds or falls short of the optimum, which is provided by the NUP 
equilibrium.  The terms in both square brackets in (7) are positive for ( > 0.  The first square 
brackets is multiplied by an increasing function of fixed cost.  Thus, when fixed costs are high, the 
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free entry UP equilibrium number of varieties exceeds the optimum (NUP) number, nt - nc.  
Specifically, let  F1  be the critical fixed cost that makes diversity the same across regimes.17  nt > nc  
iff  F > F1.  We can also show that as  (  increases, the critical value of  F1  increases;18  therefore for 
large  (, it is more likely to have  nt > nc. 
 
V. Equilibria with Non-Zero Competitive Responses 
 Up to this point, the analysis has assumed that competition is Nash in quantities.  It is fairly 
easy to modify the framework set out in Section III so that Nash equilibria in other strategic 
variables, such as price or market share can be compared with the UP and NUP Nash quantity 
equilibria and the optimum.  These comparisons provide additional insights into competitive NUP 
pricing strategies, including the possibility of competitive two-part tariffs with per unit charges less 
than marginal cost.  Facilitating these comparisons is the fact that Nash competition in another 
strategic variable can always be expressed in terms of the amount by which a seller's competitors' 
quantities must change to hold their values of the strategic variable constant in the face of its own 
changes in this variable.19  For example, the Bertrand assumption that a seller believes that its 
competitors will not change their prices in response to a cut in its own price is equivalent to the 
belief that they will reduce their outputs enough to hold their prices constant.   
 Key to the comparisons of Nash equilibria in different strategy spaces is the fact that all zero-
                                                 
    17  F1 = "b{(a - k)[1 - ("+1)-(/("+1)]/b["+1 - ("+1)("-()/("+1)]}("+1)/". 
 
    18  dF1/d( is proportional and of the same sign as 
 
(a-k)(1+")-1+(/(1+")[1+"-(1+")"/(1+")]Log[1+"]/{b[(1+")(/(1+") -(1+")"/(1+") + "(1+")(/(1 +")]2} 
 
which is positive since the first square brackets and the logarithm are positive. 
 
    19  See Economides (1995) for a formal proof of this equivalence. 
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profit equilibria are characterized by tangencies of firm-perceived average revenue and average 
surplus schedules to a common average cost function.  Changes in the average revenue and average 
surplus schedules that firms believe constrain their profits shift these tangencies with fairly obvious 
implications for equilibrium outputs and numbers of firms. 
 Let  )i  represent firm i's belief regarding  Mxc/Mxi.  Up to this point we have worked with the 
assumption that  )i = 0, i.e., that firms set output on the belief that their competitors' outputs are 
fixed.  Let  ri(xi)  be the schedule of prices for product i that incorporates i's beliefs regarding its 
competitors' output responses to variations in its own output.  ri  has slope  Mpi/Mxi + )i(Mpi/Mxc), and 
is flatter or steeper than  pi  for  )i  negative or positive, respectively.  Because firm  i  attempts to 
maximize  (ri - ki)xi - F, a zero profit symmetric equilibrium is characterized by conditions 
 
 
 pi(xc) = AC(xc) 
 
and 
 
 pi(xc, xc, n) + (Mpi/Mxi + )iMpi/Mxc)xi - k = 0, 
 
 
where k is marginal cost as before. 
 These two conditions imply  dAC/dx = Mri/Mxi = Mpi/Mdxi + )i(Mpi/Mxc); thus, firms' perceived 
inverse demand functions are tangent to their average cost functions, dAC/dxi = (k - AC)/xi.  
Substituting from the first order condition for  k  and setting  AC = p  gives  dAC/dx = Mpi/Mdxi + 
)i(Mpi/Mxc).  Otherwise firms would not be satisfied with price equal to average cost.   Let  riz  be  ri  
for  )i = 0 and let  rin  be  ri  for some  )i < 0, as would be the case with Bertrand competition for 
example.  Consider the Cournot (fixed quantities) UP equilibrium described in Section III.  The UP 
equilibrium with  )i = 0  is depicted in Figure 4 by the tangency of  riz(xc*, xc*, nc*)  with  AC(x)  at  xc*.  ri
n(xi, xc*, nc*)  also passes through this point of tangency.  (xc*, nc*)  cannot be a UP equilibrium if  )i < 0  
as reflected in  rin  because each of the  nc*  competitors will lower its price in an effort to move into 
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the region above  AC  to the right of the point of the tangency with  riz.  Thus, with Bertrand 
competition equilibrium UP outputs would be larger than the Nash quantity equilibrium output. 
 Larger equilibrium outputs also imply fewer firms for a Bertrand equilibrium than for a 
Cournot equilibrium.  Each equilibrium tangency must lie on a firm-scaled industry inverse demand 
function.  We showed in Section III.B that industry inverse demand functions are steeper than firms' 
inverse demand functions when  )i = 0.  Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 4, q2, the industry inverse 
demand function passing through the  rin-AC  tangency must lie to the right of  q1, the industry inverse 
demand function passing through the  riz-AC  UP equilibrium tangency.  The fact that  q2  is to the 
right of  q1  implies fewer firms in the negative conjecture UP equilibrium.   
 Clearly the conclusions of this analysis are reversed if  )i > 0.  ri  will be steeper than  pi  so 
that equilibrium outputs will be smaller than  xc*  and the equilibrium number of firms will be greater 
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than  nc*. 
 The analysis of NUP equilibria for Bertrand and other beliefs that are non-Nash in quantities 
parallels that for UP equilibria.  Each firm captures all of the surplus associated with its own output, 
so  Ai = I0
xi p(y, xc, n)dxi - kxi - F.  Let  *i  be the amount by which the representative firm expects its 
competitors' outputs to change in response to a small positive change in its own output when prices 
are non-uniform.  Then the NUP equilibrium is described by the following conditions: 
 
 ASi = AC 
 
and 
 
 pi + *iI0
xi Mpi/Mxcdxi - k = 0. 
 
 
 When  *i = 0, we have  pi = k, the standard result for monopolists able to perfectly 
discriminate in price and the constant quantities (zero conjecture) NUP competitive solution of 
Section II.  This is also the welfare optimum.  However, the equation of non-uniform pricing with 
optimum variety and output breaks down if competitors are not expected to hold their outputs 
constant because  pi … k  in equilibrium.   
 Let  Ri(xi)  be the schedule of values for its average surplus that incorporate firm i's beliefs 
regarding its competitors's output responses to changes in its own output. 
 
 
 MRi/Mxi = [pi - ASi + *iI0
xi Mpi(y, xc, n)/Mxcdy]/xi. 
 
 
The two equilibrium conditions imply20 
 
 
 dAC/dxi = MRi/Mxi = MASi/Mxi + *iI0
xi Mpi(y, xc, n)/Mxcdy]/xi, 
                                                 
    20  The first inequality is produced by substituting from the first order condition for  k  in  dAC/dxi 
= (k - AC)/xi and then substituting ASi  for AC  from the zero profit condition, dASi/dxi = (pi - ASi)/xi 
 gives the second equality. 
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and, because  ASi = Ri = AC  in equilibrium, that  Ri  is tangent to  AC. 
 Assume  *i < 0.  Then  Ri  is flatter than  ASi, which implies an equilibrium tangency with the 
average cost curve that is to the right of the  ASi-AC  tangency of the zero conjecture NUP 
equilibrium.  So, if the representative firm believes that its competitors will reduce their outputs in 
response to an increase in its own output, then equilibrium NUP outputs will exceed the optimal 
value of  xn*.  Similarly, equilibrium NUP outputs will be less that the optimum if firms believe  *i > 
0. 
 Define  Q(s, n) = [I
0
s pi(xi, s, n)dxi]/s.  Q  
is a firm-scaled industry average surplus 
function analogous to the firm-scaled industry 
inverse demand function  P(s, n)  which was 
defined in section III.B.21  For  n = nn*, Q(s, nn*)  
passes through the AS-AC tangency of the 
NUP equilibrium for  * = 0, and, because 
products are substitutes, Q(s, nn*)  is steeper than 
the  ASi  curve at the tangency, as shown in 
Figure 5. 
 For  n  continuous, there is a firm-scaled industry average surplus curve through every point 
on the average cost curve.  dASi/dxi, dASi/dxc, and  dASi/dn  are all negative.  Therefore industry 
                                                 
    21  Note, however, that  Q(s, s, n)  is not the area under  P(s, s, n)  because only  xi  is allowed to 
vary in calculating  Q, whereas  P  is determined by varying  xi  and  xc  together.  xc  is fixed at  s  in 
 Q(s, n); therefore it must be less than the area under  P(s, s, n), which is one nth of the total surplus 
provided by the industry.  This is an alternative way of demonstrating Spence's (1976) result that 
even when firms practice perfect price discrimination, so that consumers receive no net benefit from 
the marginal firm, there is surplus leftover that is not captured by consumers in a monopolistically 
competitive industry. 
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average surplus schedules that lie to the right of  Q(s, nn*)  must have fewer than  nn*  firms.  Because 
for  *i < 0  the  Ri-AC  tangency is to the right of the tangency for  *i = 0, there will be fewer than the 
optimum number of firms, nn*, if  *i < 0.  A parallel analysis shows that the NUP equilibrium number 
of firms is greater than  nn*  if  *i > 0. 
 An implication of  *i … 0  in the first order condition is that competitive firms employing 
two-part tariffs will set the per unit charge below marginal cost if  *i < 0, and above marginal cost if  
*i > 0.  The intuition is straight forward.  If i's competitors respond to an increase in  xi  by reducing 
their outputs, i's inverse demand function shifts outward, which allows i to increase the size of the 
fixed component of the tariff.  The increase in the fixed component of the tariff compensates i for 
what would otherwise be losses on a per unit charge below marginal cost. 
 Similarly, if firms believe that increasing their own outputs will stimulate their competitors 
to do likewise, the per unit component of a two-part tariff will be set above marginal cost because of 
the belief that the cost of selling more will include a downward shift in its inverse demand function.  
Analogous results should hold for other types of full surplus extracting non-linear pricing schemes. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 We examined the use of two-part tariffs and more generally non-uniform pricing in 
monopolistic competition.  We found that the non-uniform pricing equilibrium is characterized by a 
tangency between the average cost and the average surplus function.  (The average surplus function 
is simply the consumers' surplus up to quantity  x  divided by  x.)  This tangency is reminiscent of 
the traditional tangency between average cost and demand characterizing equilibrium for 
monopolistic competition with uniform pricing.   
 Non-uniform pricing dominates uniform pricing as a competitive strategy when both are 
feasible.  Consideration of various ways in which full-surplus-extracting, non-uniform prices might 
be implemented suggests that non-uniform pricing is probably quite common; pricing strategies 
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traditionally viewed as examples of uniform prices are quite likely non-uniform prices instead.  
Previous attempts to estimate inverse demand functions for differentiated products such as ready-to-
eat cereals (Scherer (1979)) and beer (Baker and Bresnahan (1985)) have assumed uniform pricing.  
Our analysis raises the very strong possibility that the uniform pricing assumption, as well as the 
implied demand and surplus estimates and policy conclusions of these analyses, is inappropriate for 
these industries. 
 There are a number of important differences between the UP and NUP equilibria.  The most 
important difference is that the NUP equilibrium is efficient while the UP equilibrium is inefficient, 
when firms take their competitors' output as given.22  Depending on the relative slopes of inverse 
demand functions and average surplus functions, the UP equilibrium output per firm may be greater 
or less than the NUP equilibrium output per firm.  UP equilibrium output increases relative to NUP 
equilibrium output the flatter is the representative firm's inverse demand function relative to its 
average surplus function.  Uniform pricing may lead at equilibrium to a greater or smaller number of 
firms (and varieties) than non-uniform pricing.  The greater the degree of substitutability between 
the products of competing sellers, the larger is the UP equilibrium number of firms relative to the 
number of firms at a NUP equilibrium.  Conversely, increasing fixed cost reduces the number of 
firms in a UP equilibrium relative to the number for the corresponding NUP equilibrium. 
                                                 
    22  However, the correspondence of non-uniform pricing with efficiency breaks down when firms 
are not Cournot competitors in quantities.  For example, Bertrand equilibria (whether UP or NUP) 
have fewer firms than Cournot equilibria. 
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 Appendix 
 
 Lemma 1:  (a)  For a weakly concave demand curve, the average surplus curve is 
flatter than the demand curve, *ASN(x)* < *pN(x)*. 
 (b)  The average surplus function is concave (convex, linear) if and only if the demand 
function is concave (convex, linear). 
 
 Proof:  By definition,  AS(x) = I
0
x p(y)dy)/x.  Therefore  ASN(x) = [p(x) - AS(x)]/x < 0,  
*ASN(x)* = [AS(x) - p(x)]/x,  *pN(x)* = - pN(x).  Now, 
 
 
 *pN(x)* > *ASN(x)*  ]  p(x) - xpN(x) > AS(x).  (1) 
 
 
For linear demand, average surplus is the price at x/2, i.e., the willingness to pay at the mid-point of 
the triangle under the demand up to point x.  That is, AS(x) = p(x) - xpN(x)/2, and therefore (1) holds. 
 For a concave demand function, surplus (and therefore average surplus) at x  is smaller than for the 
linear demand passing through (x, p(x)).  Therefore for a concave demand, AS(x) < p(x) - xpN(x)/2, 
and (1) holds again. 
 To prove part (b), note that 
 
 
 ASNN(x) = (xpN - 2p + 2AS)/x2 < 0  ]  AS < p - xpN/2. 
 
 
As we have argued above, the inequality on the RHS holds for concave demand, holds as an equality 
for linear demand, and is reversed for convex demand.  QED. 
 Remark:  The proof shows that, for a linear inverse demand function, AS  is strictly flatter 
than  D.  Therefore, the same will be true for some convex functions.  However, there exist convex 
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demand functions such that  AS  is parallel to or even steeper than  D.23  Cobb-Douglas demand 
functions result in steeper  AS  curves than demand functions.24 
                                                 
    23  For example, inverse demand  p(x) = c1 + c2 + c2log(x), c2 < 0, results in total surplus  S(x) = 
x[c1 + c2log(x)]  and  average surplus  AS(x) = c1 + c2log(x).  Then the slope of the demand is equal 
to the slope of the average surplus, pN(x) = ASN(x) = c2/x.  For this demand function, the average 
surplus curve is an upward parallel shift of the demand curve.  Modifying this example slightly, we 
can find a demand curve such that its AS curve is steeper than the demand.  Consider  p(x) = c1 + c2 
+ c2log(x) + 2c3x, c2 < 0, c3 > 0.  Then  S = x[c1 + c2log(x)] + c3x2, and  AS = c1 + c2log(x) + c3x. Now 
 pN(x) = c2/x + 2c3, while  ASN(x) = c2/x + c3.  For small  c3 > 0, we have  *ASN(x)* > *pN(x)*. 
    24  Say  p1 =  x1-ax2b, with  a > 0, so that  x1 = p1-1/ax2b/a, and the elasticity of demand is  !1/a.  Then  
*p1N(x1)* = ax1-a-1x2b, and  AS(x1) = x1-ax2b/(1 - a),  *ASN(x1)* = ax1-a-1x2b/(1 - a).  Therefore  *ASN(x1)* 
> *pN(x1)* ]  1/(1 - a) > 1, true for  1 > a > 0. 
